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POSSIBLE REORGANIZATION OF FREE WORLD COMMUNIST
PARTIES TO CREATE MORE VIABLE INSTRUMENTS FOR
SOVIET "UNITY" TACTICS

1. The following is speculative. Our thoughts are based on the assumption that the new Soviet tactics are indeed more "realistic" and "flexible" than those of the Stalinist era, and also that the requirements of the USSR continue to have priority over those of the international Communist movement outside the Bloc.

2. Most Free World CPs too Heavily Identified with "Stalinism" and "USSR" in Order to Promote Current Unity Tactics Successfully.

Little elaboration is needed in stressing the point that current Soviet tactics are to promote popular fronts, especially with Socialist and liberal elements. It is also clear that the emphasis put on this "unity" tactic indicates that the Soviets intend an all-out effort in this direction. Soviet diplomacy and trade tactics underscore the emphasis and add international support to the tactics. Realistically, however, the Soviet leaders must see that, as a result of 20 years of Stalinism, CPs in general are fairly well exposed and discredited as instruments of Soviet policy and tactics. The current position of the Socialist International on Soviet overtures should have added weight to this realization, and may have played a part in the timing of the Cominform dissolution. Thus, the new "realism" and "flexibility" of the Soviets may also lead to the reorganization of Communist Parties.

3. Reorganization and Whitewash of Communist Parties as "National Parties"--an Organizational Alternative.

We recall that the CPUSA reconstituted itself as the "Communist Political Association of the United States" in January 1944. "Earl Browder....jumped to the conclusion that the post-war unity that the 'Big Three' expressed....at Teheran was, in fact, an actual agreement and that post-war peace and co-operation were therefore guaranteed. He answered that the dominant circles of United States monopoly capital were interested in and favored a peaceful coexistence and friendly competition with the USSR." (From W. Z. Foster, History of the Communist Party of the United States, pg. 422.) Browder's

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attempts to keep in tune with what he believed to be post-war Soviet tactics at the time were soon squashed--but, seen in retrospect, Browder may well have been ahead of the comrades and quite in tune with current tactics. Popular Front tactics in a non-cold war climate require special manipulative forms. We believe that the Soviets will sooner or later tackle this problem.

4. "Realism" Supersedes "Auto-Misinformation"

We believe that the "realism" of the new Soviet leadership may reflect a realization of the propensity of the Stalin system for auto-misinformation. This propensity has been recognized and deplored by many CP defectors. It consists of auto-misguidance on two different levels:

a. Unrealistic reporting on Party capabilities to higher Party echelons.

Facts and circumstances are forced into a picture which is not necessarily in conformity with the actual situation, and the reports on political or organizational developments or campaigns within a given CP or section thereof are so colored as to present the Party element concerned and its leaders in a favorable light.

b. Unrealistic evaluation of external developments and situations.

The doctrinary and dogmatic system of Communist thought has tended to be so rigid and inflexible that, even given the true basic facts of a situation, a false or unrealistic interpretation has been constructed around them in order to make them conform to the tenets of Marxist "science."

In view of the growth of "realism" and "Realpolitik" in Moscow, it will be much more difficult for the various CPs to convince Moscow of their own importance and capabilities as arms of Soviet Policy. Moscow is likely to look upon the usual reports of successes and progress with a jaundiced eye and to calculate the actual position and role of the CP concerned from a coldly realistic point of view.

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5. First Indications that CPs to be Reorganized.

There are indications that Moscow has been highly inconsiderate of its subordinate CPs in its recent campaign involving the denigration of Stalin. Palmiro Togliatti is alleged to have said that both he and Maurice Thorez protested, before the XXth Congress of the CPSU, the intended exposé of the Stalin era because of the damage it would do to the French and Italian CPs and their mass movements in those countries. He is also reported to have said that the Russians insisted on the USSR's need for the campaign of denigration, that he and Thorez were overruled and would have to face the consequent damage. The same lack of consideration for their CP satellites has been reflected in the position in which Moscow put some of the other Party leaderships by their campaign of revelation: Rakosi in Hungary, Ulbricht in Germany, the Polish leadership, Chervenkov in Bulgaria (to mention but a few). The new friendship with Tito and the renunciation of the radicalist line has forced the rehabilitation of many of the enemies of the present CP leaderships who were at one time (justly or unjustly) accused of Titoism and banished from power. According to a Rome Embassy report (Desp. #1592, 20 March), Pietro Nenni is alleged to have been told by Khrushchev last October that the Soviets were going to go ahead (with the denunciation of Stalin and the overtures to Socialist Parties), no matter how serious the consequences for the French and Italian CPs and "even if they destroyed the two Parties-- in any event their place would soon be taken by other Workers' parties." Rome Embassy also feels that Nenni estimates correctly that in the long run he, rather than Togliatti, will be backed by Moscow.

6. Perspective.

The "straws in the wind" cited in the preceding paragraph, evaluated against the background of current Soviet tactics, should alert us to a distinct possibility: Stalinist Free World CPs may suddenly re-emerge as national political parties with new progressive sounding names and possibly without some of their leaders who were too closely identified with the Stalinist past. If we are correct in assuming that the new Soviet tactics are designed for a long term, it would be fairly safe to assume further that the Soviets would not shy away from shaking up and reconstituting Free World CPs as more viable instruments of the unity drive.

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